

The Implication Of Political Patron-Client Linkages On Democratic Governance In Developing Democracies

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Abstract: Political development of emerging liberal democracies is gauged based on the level of democratic governance. Democratic governance promotes citizens' participation, transparency and accountability in access to information and use of public resources, responsiveness to citizens' needs, effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery, equitability in sharing of resources, inclusiveness in decision making and the rule of law. This review paper examined the implication of political patron-client linkages/networks and practices on democratic governance in developing democracies. This review paper relies on the existing secondary data from various parts of the world in providing a conceptual explanation of political patron-client networks/linkages how it impact on democratic governance. This study noted that patron-client networks and practices have profound negative implications for the way in which democracy functions, and the capacity of governments to produce needed public policies and services. It generally reverse the standard accountability relationship, affects the development of the political institutions necessary for democratic development and accountability, leads to politicization of the state administrative bureaucracy, contribute to larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies, increases cases of corruption and a culture of impunity and make it difficult to punish individuals for corrupt behavior. Patron-client linkage is therefore pervasive to the practice of good governance in the developing democracies and this study recommends for economic liberalization, democratization reforms, decentralization of governance, civil service reform and electoral civic education as mitigative measures.

Keywords: Patronage, Clientelism, Networks and Democratic Governance

I. INTRODUCTION

Patronage and clientelism are concepts widely used in the analysis of political and social relations in various political systems, and in contemporary political science literature denote a particular strategy of gaining political support by individuals or parties through the distribution of individual or collective goods or services to prospective loyal voters (Hicken, 2011). While clientelism is used with reference to a dyadic relationship between two individuals of unequal socioeconomic status, patronage involves distribution of state resources by office holders to loyalist owing to their immense support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Klopp, (2012) posit that clientelism means the selective favourable treatment of individuals by the state, usually in exchange of votes for the

politician or the party offering the selective treatment. Patronage may be understood conventionally to involve a more or less dyadic relationship between a party (or politician) on one hand, and a supporter or group of potential supporters on the other, whereby the party and politicians uses political power in order to cement political support within the wider community (Mbabazi and Pyeong, 2015). According to Kopecky, (2011) patronage means a bias in regard with the distribution of public jobs and other state-based transfers to a certain social class, local or ethnic group, but does not necessarily involve the bending of public-decision making in order to favour selected individuals.


Patronage politics involves political parties and the politicians using their own resources or resources at their disposal in public institutions or other arenas, to compensate

and reward individuals or groups who have played an important role in party life and party strategy especially towards winning in elections (Hicken, 2011). In some cases, this takes the form of a material reward, such as granting a favoured supporter a position on a company board or semi-public institution which enjoys particular benefits or salary while in some other case the reward is based more on status and title, as when key supporters or party fundraisers are rewarded with ambassadorships, titles, or judicial appointments (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). In other cases, selective incentives are offered on a wider scale to help tie new supporters to the party, such as development projects or land offer in exchange for political support or endorsement at a coming election, or when influential and loyal party leader(s) are assured of future political support to a higher political office (Boone and Kriger, 2010). In a clientelistic relationship, the more powerful individual, or the patron, may or may not be someone who holds an official position such as the party boss or deputy in the parliament. Consequently, the "favours" that he does for his clients may come from his own personal influence, status, and economic power and not necessarily from his access to public resources (Klopp, 2012). It is with this understanding of patronage that clientelistic practices are most closely associated.

Studies by Dubois and Blank, (2018) and Diemer, (2012) noted that in patron-client politics, patron-client network creates a dyadically structured system in which the basic structural unit is the dyad. They describe a dyadic relationship as a personal attachment/relationship involving some form of interaction between two individuals/actors in politics and according to Kitschelt (2000), there are two types of dyads; one is corporate dyads and the other is exchange dyads. In the former, the two persons behave as one, while in the latter they maintain their separate identities. The analytical characteristics of these types of dyads include; first, dyads may bind persons of different occupational or class backgrounds as well as those of the same backgrounds. Secondly, benefits obtained through dyadic exchanges tend to be particular rather than categorical (exchanging rewards does not mean that each partner support the goals of the whole category to which the other belongs). Thirdly, dyadic exchanges tend to involve some degree of reciprocity, but need not achieve exact reciprocity since the achievement of the latter facilitates the termination of the dyad.

Kura, (2014) also noted that dyads are usually linked to other dyads in larger structures and all the dyadic ties within a society constitute its dyadic network. Each member of a dyadically structured system has a personal combination of dyadic partners which is uniquely his own. An individual's personal set of dyadic relationships constitute his dyadic web. Personal webs can be subdivided analytically into horizontally and vertically structured ones. Horizontal webs are those whose central individual has status, resources or power roughly equal to those of his various partners and when they are political, these relationships become a "personal alliance systems". On the other hand, vertical webs are those whose central individual has greater status, resources or power than his various dyadic partners have. As such, patron-client relationship is undertaken between individuals or networks of individuals in a vertical fashion rather than between organized

corporate groups and they undermine the horizontal group organization among clients and patrons themselves (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Katz, (2011) insists that the basic patron-client relation transforms into clientelist social formation which usually consists of numerous patron-client dyads with multi-tiered network of relation, and pyramid shaped figure. Stating about the link between patron and client, Scott (1972) states two typical representations of such links. First, the links in which clients are directly tied to patron - a patron-client cluster. Second, the links in which vertical links of clients are tied to patron - a patron-client pyramid (see Figure 1.1).



Source: Scott (1972)

Figure 1: Patron-Client Network/Linkages

The patrons, who are the parties or politicians, have clients, who are voters or potential supporters, with the link between the two being vertical and dyadic, and being little different from the sort of patron-client relationships that are also found in non-political settings (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Both patron-client and brokerage linkages between politicians and voters have been shown to be particularly important in rural and less economically well-developed regions, as well as in political systems in developing countries, and it is precisely this form of linkage which is assumed to be challenged by modernization, on the one hand, and by the development of the mass party organization, on the other (Chandra, 2007).

Historically, Political patronage and clientelism emerged as key analytical concepts in studies on social and political change by political scientists and anthropologists during the 1960s and 1970s (Mbabazi and Pyeong, 2015). Early studies provided empirical evidence based on ethnographic case studies as well as new analytical constructs and theoretical perspectives on traditional patron-client relations especially in predominantly agrarian societies (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). The first wave of research on clientelistic relationships underscored the dyadic and asymmetrical nature of the ties between individuals of unequal power and status such as those which existed between landlords and peasants in Southeast Asia (Chandra, 2007). Other early studies on political clientelism also included studies which delineated the integration of the traditional patron-client ties, based on the

personal relations between locally influential notables and their peasant clients, into the organizations of political parties as a result of political, social and economic changes (Klopp, 2012; Kopecky, 2011; Stokes, 2007 and Roniger, 2004). The basic assumption of most of the early studies was that economic development and industrialization would undermine the saliency of clientelistic practices since they were largely associated with pre-industrial societies (Roniger, 2004). It was hypothesized that as countries became more developed, the influence of cultural traditions associated with traditional societies would gradually diminish (Chandra, 2007). Additionally, the developmentalist and culturalist approaches to clientelism and patronage also assumed that as a result of social, economic and political changes, horizontal group or class affiliations would replace the vertical ties of clientele networks as the primary bases of political preferences and electoral choice. However, various contemporary studies indicate that patronage and clientelistic practices continues to thrive even in the modern developed democracies such as in USA, France, Japan, Britain and Australia (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018 and Hutchcroft, 2014).

Studies by Osayi (2015) and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) observed that among the clientelistic practices evident in most developing liberal democracies include the following; first is the outright gifts where politicians may give food, liquor, clothes, appliances, building materials, and many other scarce and valuable items to voters. These goods may change hands before elections, after elections, in part before and in part after elections, or even during the regular term at some other point in time (also see Posner and Young, 2007). Secondly is preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes where major social programs leave rather little wiggle room for clientelistic manipulation, as they are based on general and precisely operationalized rules of contribution and eligibility. This applies in most countries with the biggest social programs, such as old age pensions, health care insurance, basic unemployment, income replacement, and some family benefits (also Chandra, 2007). Thirdly is the preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector. The reach of political parties touches a variety of other employment situations that are not formally in the public economy and this applies to non-profit social and cultural services that are run in an arrangement of subsidiarity by formally non-state civic organizations set up by churches or political parties, running from kindergartens through hospitals and counseling centers to nursing homes (also Stokes, 2007). There are also state-owned enterprises that may have private legal status, but the corporate governance of which is shot through with party representation, particularly in the personnel departments that make appointments based on political patronage.

Fourthly, is the access to government contracts or procurement opportunities. It involves the award of government procurement contracts to employers who then function as enforcers of their employees' voting support or campaign assistance for their partisan benefactors is a common clientelistic practice (also Pappas and Assimakopoulou, 2012). It is a common practice in state-owned or regulated enterprises, but also extends the reach of party patronage deep into the heartland of private capitalist

business. Lastly is the application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies. Politicians and their administrative appointees in regulatory agencies interpret and apply regulatory code in favorable or unfavorable ways contingent upon the company's willingness to make its employees a rank-and-file army in the electoral battle on behalf of the benefactor (also Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018 and Hutchcroft, 2014). Areas in which regulatory discretion may be particularly important for clientelistic quid-pro-quo include zoning laws, construction and environmental codes, product safety laws, certification of companies and professions, a host of rules in finance and banking regulation, including loan guarantees, export and import licenses, or regulated access to foreign currency (also Hutchcroft, 2014).

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that political actors such as the politicians and political parties (patron) uses their own resources or public resources at their disposal to influence the voters (clients) and subsequently the outcome of an election to their favor both in the developed and developing democracies. This creates patron-client linkage/network which is more pronounced in the developing countries and such networks become the basis upon which national and local resources are shared. It based on this backdrop that this review paper sought to examine the implication of political patron-client linkages on democratic governance in developing democracies.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This review paper provides conceptual explanation and examines issues related to patron-client linkages and democratic governance in liberal societies. It primarily adopts the use of existing literature in interrogating the various dynamics of patron client linkages and the features of good governance. In addition, this review paper explores on the impact of patron-client linkages on democratic governance.


III. IMPLICATION OF PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The subsequent sections discusses on the patron-client networks and democratic governance. In addition, it also examines the implication of patron-client networks on democratic governance in liberal societies.

A. POLITICAL PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The relationship between patron-client networks and democratic governance cannot be over emphasized. While the former has usually been viewed as informal exchange in a lopsided affair between the electoral patrons and clients, the latter is seen as the process of decision making and implementation towards the common good for all the citizens in a democratic society (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). According to World Bank (2017), governance refers to the mechanisms, processes and institutions for determining and managing public affairs and society. It permeates broad

aspects including the extraction of resources and its distribution, resource control, policy making, participation, electoral processes and the management of public affairs (Caraway, Ford, and Nugroho, 2015). Good governance therefore means the effectiveness in the management and determination of public affairs and effective service delivery and coordination of governance. As a means of enhancing good governance in democratic societies, democratic accountability helps to hold public official responsible for any decision, actions or inaction having an impact on the lives of the citizen (Hilgers, 2012). According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP, 2016) report, good democratic governance and can be assessed on specific parameters such as: citizens' participation, consensus building, transparency and accountability, responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, equitability and inclusiveness, and the rule of law.



Source: UNESCAP, 2016

Figure 2: Features of Good Governance

In line with the UNESCAP, (2016) on good governance, citizen participation in various political activities such as elections, referendum and policy making within the state is important and it must ensure free participation of both men and women and other social groups in the society. The citizens have the right to make electoral choices and support ranging from a free will voting to organized behavior such as campaigns to support a particular candidate (Kristinsson, 2016). Patron-client relations can however compromise on this important feature and consequently constrain democratic accountability. In developing democratic societies, political patrons can adopt vote buying from the clients which affects free will participation (Dargent, 2014). This scenario can also cuts across several dimensions in which groups and individuals are offered financial inducement to participate in a certain manner or not to participate at all (Gherghina, 2014). The uptake of the various goods or services from the political patrons by the voters compromises on democratic accountability even as the electorates loses the moral responsibility to hold public officials accountable over mismanagement of public funds and other electoral

malpractices (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Research studies in Romania, Turkey, Malaysia, Nigeria and Uganda noted that apart from patrons influencing electorates' choice of candidate, deceit and unfulfilled promises constitute a source of discouragement to a number of voters from participating in election and other political activities (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007 and Gherghina, 2014).

Secondly, UNESCAP, (2016) observes that good governance is consensus oriented and requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in various socio-economic and political an issue bearing on the whole society. Consensus building is essentially in order to avoid conflicts emerging from divergent views and interest between various groups within the state (Gherghina, 2014). This features therefore implies a collective decision making either directly by the citizens from various social groups or through their representatives. Patron-client linkages renders this feature obsolete as loyalty to the patron become more important than seeking consensus with other group members (Aspinall, Berenschot and Hendrawan, 2017). In a political activity such as election, various social groups may fail to have consensus on electing servant leaders and instead pledge loyalty to corrupt leaders since they are beneficiaries of the loot (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

According to Wenibowei (2011), elections in some developing nations such as Nigeria and Zimbabwe are mere formality for the confirmation of a candidate already selected by flexing a more financial muscle in election campaigns. Electorates are thus deprived of consent to elect their preferred leaders as a result of the activities of clients working vehemently on behalf of their patrons whose interest they represent. Thirdly transparency and accountability constitute a significant feature of good governance (UNESCAP, 2016). Transparency means that decision taken and their consequent enforcement are done in line with an established rules and regulations and in line with the constitution. According to the UNESCAP, 2016 report on governance, transparency also means that information is freely available and accessible to those who are directly affected by it. On the other hand, accountability means that government officials are responsible to the people that brought them into power and whatever action that takes place in the daily operation of government ought to put the peoples' interest at the core. Research studies such as in Italy, India, Singapore and Nigeria indicate that transparency and accountability has been crippled by patron-client networks characterized by politicians rendering certain goods and financial inducements to the people in order to influence their choice of political candidate during electioneering period (Pande, 2008). The study further notes that once in power, the talk of accountability becomes irrelevant because politicians assume that the masses have been rewarded for their service and have to recover their money spent in campaigns and vote-buying through all means.

India is a successful case where the adoption of transparency enabling legislation on a highly democratic context has effectively helped improve democratic accountability (World Bank, 2017). The adoption of a Right to Information Act (RTI) (2005) provided grassroots campaigners with the impetus they needed to stimulate collective action around the effective application of a Public -

food- Distribution System (PDS). Using government records obtained through the RTI, social organizations have been able to examine the intended against the real transfer of food subsidies of the PDS scheme and consequently providing a means through which effective response from government officials can sanction corrupt officials and restore the fairness of distribution chains (World Bank 2007 and Pande, 2008). Fourthly, responsiveness implies that institutions and processes established to provide public goods and services should serve all stake holders within a reasonable timeframe (UNESCAP, 2016). Any constituted should at all times be sensitive to the demand of the people and react promptly to any threat to the existence of it citizens. In democratic societies, elected leaders should yield to the demands of those who elected them because they have been given such constitutional mandate through a free and fair election (Mares and Young, 2016). Concerns have however been raised in emerging democracies where local and national government have been unresponsive to the needs of their citizens. As noted by Gherghina, (2014), patron-client practices during the electioneering period create a gap between political leaders and the voters especially in regions where the voters didn't vote for the political party in power.

Another key feature of good governance is that it ensures efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public goods and services (UNESCAP, 2016). For institutions to produce expected results there should be an organized and efficient human capital and well established structures to handle them. In relation to this, patron-client network in various democratic societies brings about the emergence a human capital that either lacks the leadership capacity to govern or they are insensitive to the needs of the society having paid the cost of attaining power (Aspinall, Berenschot and Hendrawan, 2017). Research studies on electoral politics in growing democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America is characterized by vote-buying mechanisms and other informal means in order to secure political positions by the political elites (Hutchcroft, 2014). Studies by Stokes, (2005) and Weghorst and Lindberg, (2011) noted that upon the attainment of power, the objective of the ruling elites is to recoup the amount that was utilized during the election period and have selective appointment of individuals who contributed to their political success regardless of merit or work experience. Consequently, development agenda in their party manifesto such as construction of roads, electricity connections, health care provision and employment creations are shelved until the next electoral cycle. Thus, the clientele's nature weakens bureaucratic institutions and thereby rendering them inefficient and ineffective while also hindering good governance since it hinders development from taking place (Aspinall, 2014).

Another significant feature of good governance given by UNESCAP is equity and inclusiveness which constitute cogent elements. A society's well-being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in the management of its affairs and do not feel excluded from the mainstream decision making process (Askim, et. al., 2017). Given the heterogeneous nature of democratic societies in terms of religion, gender, class, political affiliation, race etc., various subgroups should actively be engaged in every

political activity within the state and should also have a stake in the sharing of national resources (Banerjee, et.al., 2014). Patron-client network however, creates a whooping gap between the rich and the poor and between or amongst regions. Such gap for instance alienates the lower class from any decision making process and inclusiveness becomes elusive (Aspinall, 2014). Katz, (2011) posit that after elections in most African states, the elected leaders rarely engage the locals from their various constituencies on setting policy agenda. Instead, political elite formulate policies to suit their interests and thus confirms Dye and Zigler, (1981) that public policies does not reflect demands of the masses but rather the prevailing values and preferences of the elite.

Lastly, good governance helps to ensure that the rule of law within the state prevails (UNESCAP, 2016). The rule of law implies the supremacy of the constitution and all other state laws over all the citizens (both the leaders and the subjects). As noted by UNESCAP report, rule of law requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially and indiscriminately. It requires protection of human rights and freedoms and impartial enforcement of rules and regulations anchored on independent judiciary (Chadwick, 2017). Various studies notes that advanced democracies such as USA, Britain, Australia and Germany have met this threshold but emerging democracies in Africa, Asia and Latin America still have loopholes that must be addressed in order to enhance the rule of law (Culbert, Pomirchy and Sonenshein, 2015). As noted by Katz, (2011), the outcome of electoral disputes launched in courts in countries such as Philippines, Malaysia, Nigeria and Uganda have been influenced by the executive that wields much power including appointment of judicial officers based on the patron-client linkages and thus the need to protect the system. The salient finding from this literature is that the process of democratic transition has been different in Africa than it has been in areas with corporatist regimes such as Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. The path dependence of patronage politics in Africa is argued to have erected substantial barriers to political participation and increased accountability that usually accompanies democratic transitions.

B. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Varying research findings and various literature indicates that patron-client politics in different liberal societies largely have negative implications (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018; Ishkanian, 2015; Gherghina and Soare, 2013 and Roniger, 2004). First, it points to the redistributive and social welfare aspects of clientelist exchange and argues that the standard for comparison should not only be programmatic political systems but also predatory or exploitative systems. Clientelism may be less than ideal, but if the alternative is a state that provides fewer benefits to citizens, especially the poor, then clientelism is not such a bad bargain (Gherghina and Soare, 2013). Clientelism can be one important mechanism for securing transactional benefits from the state. Second, there is also a line of argument that stresses the benefits of localism and specialization. Clientelism is a mechanism for dividing up national public goods and distributing them to local

constituencies (Ishkanian, 2015). There are costs in terms of lost efficiencies and economies of scale, but in exchange electorates get outcomes that are better calibrated to local needs and conditions, for instance some clients will receive cash, others foodstuffs, others local public goods, depending on local demands (Roniger, 2004).

As noted by Aspinall and Berenschot, (2018), Contemporary literature reveals that patron-client politics has profound negative implications for the way in which democracy functions, citizen attitudes about the quality of their democracy, and the capacity of governments to produce needed public policies and services. To begin with, it has the potential to reverse the standard accountability relationship that is central to democratic theory. By obliging voters to give up some of their political rights in exchange for access to distributive benefits, clientelism limits the exercise of citizenship rights and ultimately undermines democratic accountability (Ishkanian, 2015).

In clientelist systems, voters may lose the ability to effectively hold politicians and political parties accountable for their behavior in office, and instead, voters become the ones held accountable for their actions by parties and politicians (Kitschelt et al. 2010). A patron-client network also affects the development of the political institutions necessary for democratic development and accountability by warping systems of representation and accountability, consolidates incumbency advantage, and undermine the promise of a secret ballot (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Clientelism is also associated with the politicization of the bureaucracy and is an impediment to the development of a system of administrative control and oversight (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018). Other research studies such as by Ishkanian, (2015) and Kitschelt et al. (2010) opined that there is evidence that the freedom of information is higher in programmatic party systems compared to their clientelist counterparts. Programmatic systems tend to have lower electoral volatility, lower party-system fragmentation, and higher levels of party system institutionalization (Kitschelt et al. 2010). In addition, clientelism shapes the behavior of political parties in power. For example, Stokes, et.al, (2013) finds that clientelist parties behave differently in the legislature than do their more programmatic counterparts. For instance, political parties in the more clientelist state legislatures such as Brazil and Argentina are less likely to rely on roll-call voting and less cohesive when they are in the opposition. In terms of governance and economic performance, clientelism is clearly linked to higher levels of rent seeking, but this does not necessarily translate directly into poor economic performance (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2018).

Patron-client politics tends to distort incentives in predictable ways and is thus associated with certain patterns of governance and a number of studies find a correlation between patron-client linkages and the size of the public sector, whether measured in jobs or wage bills for instance in Greece, Malaysia and Thailand (Gherghina and Soare, 2013 and Katz, 2011). Similarly, patron-client network has been linked to larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies in most developing democracies such as Brazil, South Africa, Ghana and Nigeria. Numerous studies have found a strong linkage between patron-client practices and corruption or perceptions

of corruption. As Aspinall and Berenschot, (2018) points out, clientelism drive corruption through any of three separate causal pathways. First, certain forms of clientelist exchange such as vote buying may actually be illegal. Second, by undermining the ability of citizens to hold public officials accountable, clientelism foster a culture of impunity and make it difficult to punish individuals for corrupt behavior. Thirdly, the demand for resources to support clientelist exchange may increase the incentives of politicians to raise funds through illicit means.

A study by La Raja, (2008) noted that misdirection of funds originating from political investment towards support groups has often resulted in inefficiencies in delivery of public service to the citizens. Little is done to address income earning opportunities for the majority of citizens, as priorities are given to the party supporters rather than the whole electorate via patron-client relations. The study further noted that politicization of the bureaucracy has also affected the electoral development in several ways (La Raja, 2008). It has resulted in under qualified people being drafted into administrative positions in the electorate and the impact of such actions has three main consequences. Firstly, it leads to poor work ethics and as a result, effective strategies cannot be planned and developed properly for implementation. Secondly, when public office position is earned from patronage there is often little resistance towards their superiors, when corrupt practices are undertaken by the patrons. Lastly, politicization has enabled systematic colluding by public officials and elected politicians to indulge in corrupt practices in their respective offices (La Raja, 2008 and Ishkanian, 2015).

Other research studies such as by Ismailbekova, (2014) have however noted that patron-client practices helps to advance the rights of marginalized citizens. The study noted that patron-client networks helps to create a platform through which marginalized groups can participate in local decision-making processes or direct state resources and jobs to needy and underrepresented citizens. A study by Lazar (2004) in Bolivia noted that patron-client networks are part of citizenship practice and although clients may be in a subordinate position, yet they value politicians for the purpose of representation. Similarly, a study on Kyrgyzstan by Ismailbekova (2014) noted that patronage should not be seen as incompatible with democracy. In this case, extended kinship relations are used to justify patron-client ties, thus rendering them less hierarchical and infused with trust and reciprocity. Based on the assumption of common kinship, people believe to have some power over the patron, who is expected to conform to kinship norms and honour the decisions of the community's elders (Ismailbekova, 2014). The study noted that given Kyrgyz society is dominated by kinship, those elected are expected to represent and protect their interests and will therefore actively participate.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

From the foregoing literature, patron-client networks/linkages largely characterize developing democracies especially in Africa, Asia and the Latin Americas. As a dyadically structured system in which the

relationship is mutual between the actors, the strategy is aimed at gaining political support by individual politicians or parties through bias distribution of individual or collective goods or services to prospective loyal voters such as through vote buying, ambassadorships, government appointments and promotions, award of tenders and contracts and reciprocity of future political support. This is a practice that violates good governance which emphasizes on the effectiveness in the management and determination of public affairs and effective public service delivery. This study noted that patron-client networks and practices have profound negative implications for the way in which democracy functions, citizen attitudes about the quality of their democracy, and the capacity of governments to produce needed public policies and services. It has the potential to reverse the standard accountability relationship that is central to democratic theory, affects the development of the political institutions necessary for democratic development and accountability by warping systems of representation and accountability, leads to politicization of the state administrative bureaucracy, contribute to larger public deficits and public sector inefficiencies, increases cases of corruption and a culture of impunity and make it difficult to punish individuals for corrupt behavior. Patron-client linkage is thus pervasive to the practice of good governance in the developing democracies and this study recommends for economic liberalization, democratization reforms, decentralization, civil service reform and electoral civic education.

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